direction, even though the ratio of indebtedness of the former effectively doubled during the period from 1970 to 1978. The picture is somewhat different if one regards the development of debt servicing (in % of exports). The countries which switched to the market-economy system register a slight decline of this ratio thanks to the more favourable development of their exports. Thus in 1978 this ratio was only slightly higher than the debt servicing relation of the countries which are now socialist-oriented. On the other hand, because of the poorer development of their foreign trade, the debt service ratio, which originally was very low, has almost doubled in these countries during the period under review.
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This result, which is unexpectedly clear, is largely in line with the results of the earlier analysis of country groups. It appears that low economic growth rates in spite of a similarly high rate of investment, with the appropriate consequences for foreign trade and indebtedness, are the automatic result -at least in the initial situation in which the countries of the Third World find themselves -of a socialist economic system. Insofar as social indicators were available these have not, on the other hand, revealed a clearly better performance on the part of the socialist countries but rather an equal position of both groups of countries. It should of course be remembered that it has not been possible to test the satisfaction of basic needs or to compare personal income distribution in a similarly representative form as was done for other indicators.
Summing up, it may be stated that the choice of an economic system which offers private initiative scope for development, which mobilises it and corrects it by means of indirectly operating instruments in conformity with free market principles, would clearly open up a considerable additional, and so far largely untapped, development potential for many countries of the Third World.
FOOD AID
The Development of International Food Aid Policy by John Cathie, Cambridge* The European Community is to spend ECU 680 million on food aid in 1982 -an increase of 13.3 % over 1981. Is this a sign of growing humanitarianism on the part of the EC or merely the side-product of a policy of agricultural protectionism which in the long run is harmful to the economies of both the donors and recipients of food aid? A look at the historical development of international food aid may help to provide an answer to this question, T he giving of food aid by Northern countries is an area of their economic and foreign policy that has a deep emotional appeal. On the surface it seems reasonable that food which cannot be used in North America or Europe should be given to feed the hungry of the Third World. Food aid has in the post war period represented some 15 per cent of Development Assistance Committee (OECD) aid, which is a considerable proportion. The giving of aid in kind is now an accepted and permanent feature of the rich countries' gift relationship with the poor countries. Recently the Brandt Commission has joined the long list of countries and institutions endorsing the Food Aid Convention's 10 * University of Cambridge. 82 million metric ton target for food aid donations in the 1980s.
Food aid policy, like other economic policy instruments, does not operate in isolation or without contradiction in the pursuit of its intended goals. While the feeding of hungry people is a commendable aim in itself, using food aid for the furtherance of economic and social development is a much wider and less clear goal to achieve 1. The use of food as aid is constrained by the effects of food aid policy on commercial agricultural trading interests. Food aid policy can involve stabilisation policy, disposal policy, trade policy, finance and reserve policy as well as, of course, foreign policy.
The donating of food as aid to developing countries stems from the presence in developed agricultural countries of large volumes of costly-to-store surplus (wheat) commodities. These surplus holdings were the direct outcome of policies of agricultural protection pursued by the governments of many developed countries. Food aid policy is a secondary policy outcome or residual policy of government intervention in the agricultural sector of the economy. If free trade existed in agriculture and in agricultural trade then the volumes of surplus commodities available for food aid would virtually disappear. 
Surplus Disposal Policy
The first identifiable phase of food aid policy, Surplus Disposal Policy, lasted from the introduction of PL 480 in 1954 to 1966. The main purpose of the United States' food aid policy during these twelve years was the convenience that the programme offered to the government in disposing of accumulating, costly-tostore agricultural surplus production. As internal agricultural policy helped stimulate unwanted produce (at market prices) a new adjunct to US foreign policy was developed in the form of food aid policy. This new policy instrument simultaneously helped reduce the internal financial burden of farm policy, by reducing the growing mountains of grain, and promoted the United States' Foreign Policy image as the bountious giver of bread to a hungry world. A domestic public vice was being transformed into a Foreign Policy virtue.
From 1954 to 1958, surplus agricultural commodities were bartered, mainly in Europe, for other commodities which were stockpiled in the United States. It was considered at this time that the policy of strategic stockpiling had its merits; however, bartering tended to undermine agricultural trade and particularly the trade of United States' agricultural competitors. Protests by Canada and Australia over the practice of bartering curtailed and eventually ended this method of disposing of agricultural production. Instead of bartering, food was offered as aid at concessional prices, mainly in Europe and the Far East, although some grants of food were given to the emergent independent countries.
Food for Peace
A major change in United States food aid policy was introduced in 1966, when PL 480 was renamed the Food for Peace programme. The phase of Surplus Utilisation Policy lasted from 1966 to 1971, and the new surplus disposal programme emphasised what was considered the positive and constructive use that surplus donations could play in poor countries. Food surplus, it was argued, was a form of capital and investment, no different from financial capital and equally as beneficial to the recipient economy.
To allay fears that the Food for Peace programme would pauperise recipients the "self-help clause" was introduced into PL 480. This clause sought to introduce criteria, for aid administrators, ensuring that recipients were taking steps to increase their own level of agricultural growth and economic development. (In 1964, food aid donations had reached their peak volume and agricultural production in the United States had the capacity to increase stocks at a faster rate than food aid policy could dispose of the surplus produce. Food aid policy was coming under academic and public scrutiny and found to have serious shortcomings, indeed evidence was emerging that its effects on developing countries could be positively harmful.)
It became apparent by the late 1960s that the policy of Surplus Utilisation would neither solve nor alleviate the problem of the costly farm policy programme and that a change in farm policy was therefore necessary. With the change in farm policy, and the reduction of surplus agricultural stocks the US Government was obliged to alter the terms of its food aid and reduced the volumes of its donations to the developing world. In 1966 the United States finally accepted the idea of multilateral food aid programmes and gave support to the World Food Programme of the Food and Agriculture Organisation. Both Japan and the European Economic Community established their own food aid programmes in 1968.
Residual Policy
The third phase of international food aid policy, Residual Policy, can be identified from 1971, with the reduction of the United States role as the food aid donor and the emergence of the World Food Programme and the European Economic Community Food Aid Programme. Food aid was now regarded by the United States as a residual from its commercial agricultural sales. America as a major world wheat exporter can, in
